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reply to Kellen and Singmann's comment (2017)Elisa Cooper*, Andrea Greve and Richard N. Henson
Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, England, United KingdomIn our recent article in the journal Cortex (Cooper, Greve, &
Henson, 2017), we examined memory for source and item
information using data from two different source monitoring
paradigms and six different groups of participants. When
comparing standard accuracy analysis and various Multino-
mial Processing Tree (MPT) models, we found that the type of
analysis determined the extent to which item and/or source
memory differences were found across groups (healthy young
and older groups, an older groupwithmildmemory problems,
and individuals with hippocampal lesions). Our main point
was methodological: that one could draw different conclu-
sions (e.g., whether ageing or hippocampal lesions affect only
source memory, or both source and item memory) depending
on the analysis used.
In our paper, we considered two MPT models that differed
in their tree structure. In one of the two models e what we
called the “Item-Source” model e the parameter representing
accurate source memory occurs “downstream” of the
parameter representing accurate item memory. This is the
only type of tree structure that we have seen considered in the
extensive literature of MPT models of source memory (e.g.,
Batchelder & Riefer, 1990; Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996;
Riefer & Batchelder, 1988), and would seem to correspond to
the common assumption that remembering the source in
which an item occurred is conditional on remembering the
item itself. We contrasted this model with an alternative
“Source-Item” model, in which the parameter representing
accurate source memory occurs “upstream” of the parameter
representing accurate item memory. We likened this to dual-
process models of memory (e.g., Yonelinas, 1999), in whichDOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2017.05.01
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org/licenses/by/4.0/).two processes operate: one in which the full memory is
retrieved (item and source, akin to recollection) and another in
which only item memory is retrieved (akin to familiarity).
There is considerable evidence from neuropsychology and
neuroimaging that these two processes are supported by
distinct brain systems [involving hippocampus and perirhinal
cortex respectively, (Norman & O'Reilly, 2003; Yonelinas,
2002)]. We appreciate that there is not a one-to-one mapping
from such theoretical models to MPT structures, and that yet
further tree structures are possible, depending also on how
source memory decisions are made. Our point was only to
illustrate how two example MPT structures can be associated
with different theoretical frameworks.
In their commentary on our paper, Kellen and Singmann
(2017) focus on our second paradigm, where we extended
the two MPT models to capture additional confidence
judgements. They observe that some of the parameterswithin
each of our MPT models are not monosemous, i.e., parame-
ters do not have the same meaning when occurring at
different points within the tree structure, and show that this
is the reason why the models produce different fits to the
data. We accept this criticism, and agree that MPT parame-
ters should have the same meaning within a tree, and
therefore we could not support one model over the other by
virtue of their goodness of fit to the data in our second
paradigm. However this issue is irrelevant to our larger claim
that parameters have different meanings across models, even
when they have the same meaning within each model and
even when two models fit the data equally well, as we
demonstrate below.5.
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made with our first paradigm. In this simpler paradigm, the
parameters within the Item-Source model and the Source-
Item model are monosemous, and the models fit the data
equally well. Indeed, we demonstrated the models' equiva-
lence formally in the Supplementary Material of our original
paper (www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001094521
7300047), showing that the parameters of one model can be
expressed in terms of the parameters of the other (as Kellen
and Singmann also do for our second paradigm). However, this
does not change the fact that one will obtain different nu-
merical (and possibly statistical) results from each model
when considering these parameters in isolation, and therefore
potentially arrive at different conclusions about how condi-
tions or groups differ on each parameter.
Evidence for this can be seen in the individual parameter
estimates from our first paradigm, but we also work through
an example here. Imagine that the “true”model is the Source-
Item model and that hippocampal lesions affect the
Ds parameter (reflecting source and item memory), but not
the Di parameter (reflecting item memory without source
memory). Using the equations in the Supplementary Material
available from the link above, the corresponding values
for the Item-Source model, denoted by ~Ds and ~Di, would be:
~Di ¼ 1 ð1 DsÞð1 DiÞ and ~Ds ¼ Ds=~Di
Now if we have two groups of participants denoted by su-
perscripts C for Controls and H for Hippocampal lesions, we
can take example values of DCs ¼ 0:6>DHs ¼ 0:4, and
DCi ¼ DHi ¼ 0:8. If we plug these values into the above equa-
tions, we find that ~D
C
s ¼ 0:6522 and ~D
H
s ¼ 0:4545. These values
of the “source memory” parameters from the Item-Source
model are lower than those from the Source-Item model
(which is fine, because the parameters mean different things),
but are at least of the same relative size across groups. How-
ever, the values of the “itemmemory” parameters in the Item-
Source model now differ between groups, in that ~D
C
i ¼ 0:92
and ~D
H
i ¼ 0:88, even though values in the Source-Item model
are identical, DCi ¼ DHi ¼ 0:8. If the meanings of Di and ~Di were
equated across the two models, one would falsely conclude
that hippocampal lesions affect itemmemory according to the
Item-Source model where the parameter estimates differ, but
not the Source-Item model. However, the parameters do not
have the same meaning across the two models, which is how
they can differ: in the Source-Item model, Di refers to the
probability of itemmemory without source memory, whereas
in the Item-Source model, ~Di refers to the probability of item
memory only (with or without source memory). Nonetheless,
even though parameters are not directly comparable across
models, the fact remains that one would draw quite different
scientific conclusions from testing individual parameters
across groups, depending on the model used. Moreover, thechoice of model depends on one's a priori theory (particularly
when models fit the data equally well).
In summary, both we and Kellen and Singmann agree that
there is no theory-neutral way of scoring data. This is indeed a
claim that has been made many times before (but often
forgotten nonetheless). The purpose of our paper was to
demonstrate the impact that such different theoretical as-
sumptions have on conclusions drawn from real data, such as
the effect of age or hippocampal lesions on memory. Indeed,
we aimed to extol the virtue of MPTs, compared to standard
accuracy analyses, in making such assumptions more
transparent.
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